General Interest be aware of many component details. Then, detecting bugs in such complex architectures requires to compare the behavior of each component with its specification and also to verify the interactions among all these components, stressing the entire functionality to identify corner cases potentially untested by vendors of each IP block. To this end, the common practice is to combine formal methods based on sequential equivalence checking with simulation-based approaches [5] . The first cover the verification of the single IP blocks, but they are still limited in case of aggressive optimizations or complex interactions. Therefore, system-level, simulation-based debugging methods are widely used, but they may expose sensible details of the component or the generation process. Due to the high cost of verification (more than 50% of the overall design time) [6] , system designers need automated methodologies to efficiently identify bugs without exposing any IP in an open format.
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Editor's note:
This article presents an automated approach for detecting system-level bugs in SoC designs that are composed of many IP blocks, without exposing sensitive information. The approach leverages high-level synthesis techniques.
-Binoy Ravindran, Virginia Tech  As technology scAling is showing its limitations, heterogeneous system-on-chip (SoC) architectures are becoming very popular [1] . According to International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) predictions, future SoCs will be characterized by heavy reuse (more than 90% by 2020) of intellectual property (IP) blocks for reducing design cost and time-to-market [2] . To increase productivity and tackle design complexity, system designers will increasingly use high-level synthesis (HL S) to automatically generate specialized IP blocks in a suitable hardware description language (HDL) [3] , while integrating all the components with electronic system level methodologies [4] . While IP vendors are specialized in the optimization of specific IP blocks, system designers must face new threats in terms of design and verification. First, the HDL descriptions generated with HL S are not human friendly and system designers may not that interact with such engine through a well-defined and open application programming interface (API). Similar to the formats used for the interoperability of IP blocks [8] , an open format to support cross-vendor automated bug detection would be a real revolution for hardware design and verification.
After motivating our work in the "Motivation" section, we present our approach as follows:
• A methodology based on DA for automated bug detection in HLS-generated components, with the possibility to tradeoff the precision of bug detection and the analysis time (see the "Discrepancy analysis for automated bug detection in IP-based system designs" section).
• An extension to such DA for debugging complex SoCs composed of multiple IPs. We define three cosimulation libraries that the IP providers can provide to enable DA internally to their IPs without exposing internal details (see the "Composable discrepancy analysis" section).
• A set of strategies and a unified vendor-agnostic API for DA, compatible with our composable design flow, to leverage industrial practices and state-of-the-art techniques for the protection of intellectual property of IP vendors and HLS developers (see the "Enabling discrepancy analysis with protected IP blocks" section).
We then show how our solution would improve design and verification in the "A workflow example" section.
Motivation Figure 1 shows a design flow for an SoC composed of multiple IP blocks, where each component is generated starting from a high-level description of its function. Such generation process can be done by different IP providers, manually or using HLS. During the creation of the components, specific tests are identified to validate the behavior of the generated hardware. The system designer then integrates the required IP blocks to create larger components or the final architecture.
When interacting with other components, an IP block may behave differently from what was expected. In fact, a component could contain a bug that has not been exercised by functional testing. These errors can be structural or functional [7] . The former include, for example, errors in the hardware resources that are used to implement operations or in the interconnection between components, and bit flips due to aggressive HLS optimizations. The latter include, for example, errors in the controller logic that cause the design to execute infinitely. Even if most of these bugs can be identified at the IP level, the IP providers may not know in advance all the execution scenarios and combinations of input values for the respective IPs, requiring interaction with system designers [5] .
While such IP blocks may feature metadata to simplify the integration [8] , no clear methods are usually provided to precisely identify bugs internally to the components. For instance, IP blocks are usually provided with assertions to notify unexpected behaviors of the components. This information enables designers to detect the occurrence of a bug, but only in the specific points of the design where the assertions are inserted. So, the system designer has to interact with the IP vendor, who has the necessary knowledge of the component to isolate the bug. However, this increases the verification costs with longer time-to-market and higher costs because the information shared between IP vendors and system designers is limited. Therefore, many industrial solutions are already available to verify the entire tool flow for creating an IP block, as well as its integration into a complete SoC. Example of commercial verification approaches include accelerated simulations [9] and functional/structural coverage [10] to properly identify corner cases. All major players are moving toward a comprehensive solution for SoC verification, as confirmed by the recent acquisition of Atrenta by Synopsys. However, a complete and interoperable methodology for automatic bug identification in case of several IP blocks is still missing. Our methodology, instead, adopts a novel approach: system designers do not need to manually debug the IP blocks because the comparison is performed automatically, and IP vendors do not need to disclose the internals of their IP blocks to enable debugging.
Discrepancy analysis for automated bug detection in IP-based system designs
To debug an HLS-generated IP block, we rely on DA [7] , a novel technique for automated bug detection based on the notion of equivalence between the execution of the original source code and the corresponding hardware generated through HLS. The DA flow is depicted in Figure 2 . The blue part represents the execution of the software obtained restructuring the original source code into static single assignment (SSA) form, 1 to produce the software execution traces. The orange flow depicts the RTL simulation of the hardware to generate the hardware execution traces.
These traces can be compared according to the definition of equivalence, using additional information from the HLS process. This information can be collected both on the control flow and on the data operations. DA then analyzes the execution traces to detect behavioral differences between the execution of the generated hardware and its software specification, despite the underlying execution models and their intrinsic differences. It performs fine-grained checks not only at the external interfaces of a module but also on the internal signals, including those generated by compiler optimizations. It automatically compares the actual values with the expected behavior generated in software. Any difference is isolated and back-traced to the high-level source code, automatically identifying the first point of failure [7] .
This technique is attractive to build an approach for automated bug detection in designs with multiple IP blocks.
• It is generic and flexible enough to support all the transformations and optimizations performed during HL S.
• The information used in the comparison is independent of the given HLS implementation.
• System designers are not required to know how the HL S optimizations are performed.
• It is possible to build an independent and open engine to perform the comparison offline.
• Control and data can be analyzed independently.
The rest of this section describes how DA extracts execution traces related to control flow and data, and how it analyzes them to automatically find bugs in an IP block.
Control flow traces
The control flow is a high-level description of the "paths of execution. " For software, it is usually represented with a control flow graph (CFG), whose nodes represent the basic blocks containing the operations to be executed. HLS compilers first generate the CFG from the input source code. Then, they elaborate each basic block to apply transformations (e.g., loop unrolling) to generate the states of the corresponding finite state machine (FSM). The FSM controls the execution of the hardware operations in the datapath and it is thus the natural CFG counterpart.
To perform DA, we generate control flow traces for every software function and its corresponding FSM in the generated hardware [7] . In software, we instrument the high-level code to dump the identifiers of the basic blocks traversed during execution. In hardware, the same information is represented by the waveforms of the signals representing the current FSM states. Since the FSM may not be always in execution, hardware traces do not contain valid values at every instant and must be integrated with information also on the control signals (e.g., start and done signals) to determine the interval of execution.
Operation traces
While control flow traces allow us to determine errors in the execution flow, some errors may only affect the data elaboration and the corresponding results. To this end, the result of every software statement must be compared with the value of the corresponding signal (or set of signals) in hardware. However, this comparison must be performed only when the statement is actually executed and this information is provided by the FSM states. Hence, since several operations can be executed during the same FSM state, the amount of operation-level information is usually much higher. This information can be easily obtained using the scheduling already extracted to generate control flow traces.
An operation trace is a fine-grained representation in SSA form of every statement in the original source code [7] . This greatly simplifies the debugging process and it allows DA to observe temporary variables inserted during compiler optimizations. For software, we instrument the code to dump the identifier and the value of each variable assigned by a statement. The corresponding hardware trace is represented by the single output signal of the functional unit (or the block of functional units) used to implement the righthand side of the same statement. These signals can be automatically and unambiguously identified given the HLS results in terms of resource and interconnection binding.
Automated bug detection
The key feature of DA is that its engine for automated bug detection can manipulate control flow traces and operation traces in the same way. In fact, the bug detection process aims at correlating the hardware values, which have intrinsic timing information, with the respective values computed by the execution of the same function in software. The same property holds for both control flow and operation traces. Therefore, the DA engine works iteratively as follows for every pair of hardware and software traces.
• It selects the next value in the software trace, if any.
• It selects the next available value in the hardware trace, if possible.
• It checks if the hardware and software values match.
If any of these steps fails, it means that a misbehavior (i.e., a discrepancy) has occurred.
Clearly, this process requires access to the HL S information used for the generation the IP block, potentially exposing sensible details on its implementation or on the HLS process. However, this information is not directly handled by the algorithmic template described above, which can manipulate the traces transparently, delegating the low-level operations to a third-party implementation. Hence, this algorithm can be used as a blueprint for designing an interoperable API for enabling DA in design flows involving multiple vendors.
Composable discrepancy analysis
We extend DA to achieve a composable workflow for automated bug detection in SoCs composed of several IP blocks. This approach is orthogonal and entirely compatible to other works on DA, such as [11] . Consider the scenario shown in Figure 3 , system designer aims at creating an architecture with two different IP blocks: 1) an efficient implementation of the floating-point "inverse hyperbolic tangent" (atanh) and 2) a secure cryptographic module to encrypt the result of the computation (crypto). This scenario is becoming very popular with design environments based on IP catalogs, such as Xilinx Vivado Design suite, where the IP providers may use HL S to design their components. We enclose their design flows in a thick dark box since we assume them to be unknown to the system designer. The bug detection is performed by comparing the high-level execution (in software) of the functionality with the RTL simulation of the generated hardware. By using our automated bug detection approach, the system designer is then able to find bugs across the entire design without compromising the IP of the different IP providers. To this end, we need three libraries for each IP block, as shown in Figure 3 .
• A software object: This is a library object (blue .so objects) exposing to the system designer the same API of the software function it is used to implement [in this case double atanh A library object to be linked with the open DA engine of "Automated bug detection" (green .so objects); it contains custom functions to enable DA on the trace representations generated by the other two objects.
The identification of these three artifacts is a substantial improvement upon other works on DA such as [7] , which were not at all concerned of providing clear interfaces and isolation between the different components of the bug detection process. Each one of these artifacts provides the functionalities to perform DA as described in "Discrepancy analysis for automated bug detection in IP-based system designs:" the code necessary to generate the software traces, the information necessary to extract the hardware traces, and library to compare the traces. To build our method for cross-vendor bug detection, we only require uniform and well-defined APIs so that the DA debugging engine can seamlessly interact with the debugging artifacts provided by the vendors. In fact, the execution traces can be generated and compared with no information on the internal details, which are instead contained inside the isolated vendor's objects. In "Enabling discrepancy analysis with protected IP blocks," we provide an example of the APIs to help understanding and reasoning about how every component provided by the vendors can be secured. This is not intended as a definitive product, but more as prototype, because we believe that an open standardization process involving multiple players would be the best path to reach consensus and to fulfill the needs of IP vendors, HL S developers, and system designers.
Once the vendors provide these objects with a unified format for debugging, the system designer can perform DA of the entire project as follows. The application representing the SoC specification is created and linked with the software objects describing the functions of the different IPs. This application is then executed with the user-defined inputs to generate software traces (blue region in Figure 3 ). Similarly, the hardware description of the SoC is created and simulated with the same stimuli to generate the hardware traces (orange region in Figure 3 ). Finally, hardware and software traces are compared using DA [7] together with the comparison libraries (green region in Figure 3 ). The granularity of operation-level debugging can be easily extended to full statement coverage, including temporary variables inserted by the compiler for optimizations, but it can be customized with different levels of precision. In our vision, IP vendors can offer different debugging packages to tradeoff execution time for precision in bug identification. In this scenario, the system designer can first use a debugging package which exports a limited subset of symbols for most of the IPs, limiting the effort (and the higher simulation time) only to critical components. Alternatively, since our approach is able to automatically identify the first point of failure, the system designer may ask only for debug symbols of the specific IP blocks that do not behave as expected. Using this configurable granularity for different modules, it is possible to span from localization of the bug to the faulty IP block (with coarsegrained debug) up to pinpointing the single wrong operations (with full operation granularity).
The methodology still works properly even in case of pre-existing IP blocks with no DA support (e.g., interconnection subsystems and memory controllers). In this scenario, the respective IP blocks are used as black boxes in the bug detection, provided to have high-level models for cosimulation. While it is not possible to locate internal errors, we can still identify discrepancies at the input-output ports of these components.
Enabling discrepancy analysis with protected IP blocks
Our composable approach requires vendors to provide data to be used by system designers during DA, potentially endangering their industrial secrets. In fact, DA may reveal partial information on the proprietary algorithm, the optimizations, and the design tradeoffs through the code instrumentation during the generation of the software traces. Similarly, the generation of the hardware traces may reveal information on the front-end and architectural optimizations performed during HL S. We now discuss how the three components of DA can provide support for automated bug detection while protecting the IP and making this methodology viable for vendors.
First, we need to protect the cosimulation objects: the RTL description of the IP, the software object, and the hardware object used for the generation of the traces, and the comparison library. Since the DA engine can be provided by a malicious vendor, the comparison library must be protected from snooping into the traces. Then, we need to protect also the data exported during the generation of the traces because they can be used to extract information on the IP block.
Our key idea is to provide a clearly defined API which is the only way to access the data contained in the objects given to the system designers. Figure 4 shows the high-level structure of the DA engine that enables this approach. The blue code represents the data types exported from the comparison library while the functions of the open API are depicted in green. The routine iterates on all the data structures provided by the vendors (line 1). For every vendor, it loads the hardware and the software traces (lines 3-5). Then, it iterates over all the available software traces (lines 6-31). If the software trace has no corresponding hardware trace, it reports a mismatch (lines 10-15). Otherwise, the algorithm iterates over the software and hardware traces (lines 16-30) , applying the proprietary method compare of the comparison library and eventually jumping to the next trace if a mismatch is found (lines 24-29). Finally, an additional sanity check is performed to identify hardware traces without a corresponding software trace (lines 32-41).
General Interest
The algorithm of Figure 4 has two important properties. First, the API and the DA engine make no distinctions between control flow and operation traces. Control flow and operation traces can be handled in the same way because the differences are only contained in the comparison routines that are completely enclosed in the comparison library. Second, the API and the DA engine have no information on the encoding of the data in the traces or on their relationship with the high-level source code and the RTL. Again, this is possible because the manipulation of this data is completely enclosed in the comparison library and the DA engine can manipulate them transparently. Thanks to this latter property, hardware and software traces can be encoded from the vendor. In fact, hardware and software traces are generated by the hardware object and the software object, respectively. All these libraries are provided by the same vendor and the output is directly elaborated by the comparison library, which is the only element able to effectively access the execution traces [12] .
So, every vendor can use its own protection scheme and no open information is exposed outside these libraries. For example, one can imagine to use an asymmetric encryption scheme like Pretty Good Privacy (OpenPGP standard), where the software object, the hardware object, and the comparison library have separate key pairs. The key pairs could be provided by the vendor through separate channels as part of the licensing. This would also prevent a malicious system designer to reverse engineer the encoding on the traces and, in turn, get proprietary information through the DA engine. Most of the vendors are already encrypting their IPs and our approach is compatible with any state-of-theart encryption method. For instance, the hardware object for hardware trace generation can then be embedded in the encrypted RTL design, used to generate the traces during simulation, and excluded from synthesis. The software object (for software trace generation) and the comparison library will be then provided as stripped dynamic library objects based on a standard API. The former is linked and executed with the high-level specification to generate the software traces. The latter, instead, contains primitives that are called by the DA engine to analyze the traces, as shown in Figure 4 . Similar to the RTL of the IPs, it is possible to use all the available state-of-the-art techniques to protect libraries from reverse engineering. Some examples include detecting when the library is executed in a debugger and abort, or randomizing the binary, or even compressing/encrypting the library, so that it is uncompressed/decrypted on-the-fly. The only requirement is that the encryption method is shared among the three libraries, while the rest of the DA engine interacts with them through the public API. This shows that all the artifacts used to enable composable DA can be secured against malicious analysis and reverse engineering, without compromising the capability of performing automated bug detection. Note that the implementation of a specific IP protection strategy for all the components is out of the scope of this work. There are already numerous contributions available in this field, as well as several industrial practices that are not fully disclosed. However, the proposed debug flow is completely orthogonal to and compatible with any of the current industrial practices.
A workflow example
To validate our composable approach, we reproduced the multivendor design flow described in "Composable discrepancy analysis" as follows. For atanh, we used an implementation based on the GNU C Library. The code for crypto was based on a custom implementation of the Keccak sponge function family, selected as the winner of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 2006 competition for a new Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) standard. We synthesized each original C code with B ambu [3] (our HL S tool, based on GCC 4.9, already supporting DA) to produce the corresponding RTL description with debug information. Bambu can also be used as a debugger to automatically compare the traces as post-processing. 2 We performed HL S independently on the two cores to mimic separate IP vendors and we used DA to test each IP block. Since we expect this process to be performed internally to each IP vendor (with no risk of exposing IP), we enable full debugging (both control and operation levels). We manually inserted structural and functional bugs as in [7] , and B ambu correctly reported all of them.
We then integrated these IP blocks into a larger SoC that connects them as described in Figure 3 . So, we performed verification with different debug granularities for the two IP blocks. In particular, we wanted to analyze the correlations between the granularity of the debug information exported by the IP vendors and the observability of the injected bugs. We assumed that the maximum granularity is always available at the system level. Then, to analyze the results of our approach with varying possibilities of debugging, we evaluated six scenarios, defined as follows:
• S0: the entire design flow is executed without any verification features.
• S1: the design flow is executed with no software traces, but exporting all the signals in hardware into a value change dump (VCD) waveform file.
• S2: control flow debugging is enabled for both IP blocks.
• S3: full debugging is enabled for atanh (IP1) and no debugging is enabled for crypto (IP2).
• S4: no debugging is enabled for atanh (IP1) and full debugging is enabled for crypto (IP2).
• S5: full debugging is enabled for both IP blocks.
The configurations of these scenarios and the corresponding results are reported in Table 1 . The table reports the size of the software objects (Obj size), the size of the resulting VCD traces (VCD size), and the time to perform all debugging phases, that is, the generation of the software traces with the object code execution (SW time), the generation of the hardware traces with simulation (HW time), and the DA time. The total time is reported only when all verification phases are executed because in scenarios S0 and S1 the debugging must be manually performed by the designer. All experiments have been run on an Intel Core i7-3630QM running at 2.40 GHz with a 64-bit Linux operating system and 16 GB of RAM. Simulations of the hardware designs are performed with Mentor Modelsim SE 10.5c. The VCD size gives an idea of the debugging complexity that must be manually performed by the system designer.
At this point, we injected a bug in atanh that breaks the SoC results when the input is a denormalized float. In fact, denormalized numbers are a corner case, which is often not tested thoroughly by developers. Moreover, this kind of bug does not alter the control flow of the IP block. Hence, it was not identified with the DA performed at the IP level. On the contrary, a simple simulation of the entire SoC (scenario S0) shows a misbehavior, but the SoC developer has no information to identify the problem. Additionally, when all signals are exported in the VCD (scenario S1), the simulation time grows significantly, producing more than 8 GB of waveforms. The resulting VCD is then very hard to debug. So, the first possibility was to add only control flow debug symbols to both IP blocks (scenario S2). Since full debugging was enabled for the user code of the SoC, our method was able to identify a bug as soon as the wrong result propagates outside atanh, even if it was not able to directly find any misbehavior on the control flow of the IP block. This analysis is pretty fast (about 32 seconds) and already gives information on the faulty IP block. This testcase could be already provided to the vendor as part of a bug report. At this point, the SoC designer can also enable full debugging for atanh (to obtain more precise information) while disabling all debug symbols in crypto (to save time). In this way (scenario S3), it was possible to identify the point of failure, confirming that the bug was inside atanh. In Table 1 , we also report the time required to perform the equivalent analysis only on crypto (scenario S4) and on both IP blocks (scenario S5). In particular, the latter represents the upper bound of the analysis for this SoC design and the total execution time is still reasonable, confirming the validity of our approach for creating a composable and scalable verification approach. In fact, in all these three scenarios, the total execution time is comparable with the time for generating the full VCD in scenario S2 (266 seconds). However, in these cases the analysis is totally automated and already includes the time to identify the bug, while General Interest in scenario S2 the identification must be manually performed by the designer.
We presented a design flow for the verification of SoC architectures composed of multiple IP blocks generated with HL S. Our approach is based on DA and it can easily identify bugs coming from IP integration. Since the analysis can be performed without leaking any information on the IP design, it is suitable for industrial adoption and it provides advantages for both IP vendors and system designers. It can improve the productivity of system designers, allowing them to promptly identify bugs also in given IP blocks and in their integration. IP providers and HLS vendors can potentially receive more meaningful bug reports without compromising their secrets. In this way, part of the verification effort is shared with the system designers, leading to better products in a shorter time. The approach is composable and it also supports pre-existing IP components without debugging capabilities. All these advantages advocate the definition of a unified and interoperable standard (to be included in the HL S tools) for automated bug detection in systems composed of multiple IP blocks. 
